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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

7737

AUGUST SCHRIEBER,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Respondent's theory in this case has, as shown by its
brief, entirely changed since the District Attorney for the
Third Judicial District made and filed his petition to vacate
and set aside the order of October 20, 1949, dismissing the
action against defendant and discharging him. As shown
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by the record, Respondent made and filed on May 29, 1951,
a petition to vacate the order of October 20, 1949, and to
order the defendant to appear before the Court and show
cause why the order of October 20, 1949, should not be
vacated.
The only grounds alleged in said petition for vacating
the order were ( 1) that a condition of the order was permanent departure from the State of Utah, which had been
violated upon defendant's return to Utah, and (2) that the
order was contrary to Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution. No notice or suggestion was given in said petition of any other grounds for vacating the order. The citation which subsequently issued on the basis of said petition contained and was accompanied by no notice of any
grounds for vacating the order other than stated above.
At the hearing on said petition no claim or argument was
made by Respondent as grounds for said petition other than
those stated. No evidence was offered or introduced by
Respondent bearing upon grounds for vacating the 1949
order except those stated. At no time was a claim of fraud
or misrepresentation in procuring said order made until the
Judge who heard the case vaguely expressed such contentions in his oral opinion after all the evidence was in; Now
for the first time in its brief the Respondent seizes upon the
vague and ambiguous remarks of the said Judge to fortify
an argument that the court acted properly in vacating the
order of October 20, 1949. The original grounds alleged by
Respondent for vacating said order have now been abandoned and are conceded to be without merit.
At page 4 of its brief Respondent states that a good
argument can be made that the order of October 20, 1949,
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was contrary to Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution,
but the brief utterly fails to reveal the nature of that argument. The suggestion ignores the first sentence of the constitutional provision which in unmistakable terms empowered the legislature to enact Section 105-36-17, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, pursuant to which said
order was made.
Respondent apparently no longer contends that the
order contained a condition that defendant permanently
remain outside the State of Utah. At page 13 of its brief
Respondent quite frankly concedes that such a condition
would be void. Thus Respondent concedes that the order
of October 20, 1949, was a final, unconditional order, and
submits as its only contention on this appeal the proposition
that the court vacated the October 20, 1949 order, with
authority to do so, on a finding of fraud, misrepresentations
and deceit made to the trial court. In this Reply, therefore,
Appellant will confine his discussion to that point. There
are four aspects to that contention which require consideration, and they are as follows :

I.

VACATION OF THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20,
1949, ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD REQUIRED A
FINDING OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD, WHICH
DID NOT EXIST.
Appellant does not take issue with the well established
principle of law that a court has the power to vacate a
judgment or an order where the judgment or order was
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procured by fraud. As an abstract proposition, Respondent
has correctly stated the law. Within the framework of this
principle of law, however, there are definite requirements
which must be present to invoke its operation. It isn't every
variety of fraud which justifies invocation of the power.
The authorities are in complete accord that the fraud must
be of an extrinsic and collateral nature.
31 Am. Jur. Judgments, Sections 735, 738;
49 Corpus Juris Secundum, Judgments, Section
269.
This court has had frequent occasion to consider and
apply the principle stated, and has consistently limited its
application to cases of extrinsic fraud.

Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 151
Pac. 986;
Anderson v. State, 238 Pac. 557;
Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 16 P.
(2d) 1097;

Rice v. Rice, 212 P. (2d) 685.
The foregoing decisions, as well as the authorities elsewhere, hold that a judgment cannot be set aside except for
the most compelling reasons; they hold that fraud as to a
matter or issue actually or potentially before the court does
not constitute extrinsic fraud such as to constitute grounds
for setting a judgment aside. Examples of extrinsic fraud
are the following: Bribery of witnesses or preventing witnesses from testifying, inducing a party by deceit to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the court, preventing a
party from testifying, and other examples pertaining to
collateral matters too numerous to mention. Misrepresenta-
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tion or perjury, even if established, as to a matter in issue
or material to issues, does not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Thus, in Cantlcell v. Thatche,r Bros. Banking Co., supra,
this court refused to apply the principle where the alleged
fraud was perjury as to issues actually or potentially pertinent to the judgment. Again, in Anderson v. State, supra, this
court held that an alleged conspiracy to mislead the court
as to material issues and perjury did not constitute the type
of fraud required to set aside a judgment.
This limited application of the principle was again
followed by this court in Logan City v. Utah Power & Light
Co., supra, where the court held that alleged false and fraudulent representations to the court as to material issues would
not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Now what is the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in
this case upon which Respondent relies? The alleged fraud
can pertain only to Appellant's alleged representations as to
his health, the advisability of trying a different climate and
Appellant's intention with respect to going to Florida and
remaining away from Utah. Appellant is unable to determine precisely which of these factors is the subject of the
alleged fraud. In any event, whichever factor it is, it seems
clear that the alleged fraud goes to an intrinsic matter, not
an extrinsic one. The alleged fraud is similar to the alleged
conspiracy to misrepresent in the Anderson case, supra, and
the alleged perjury in the Cantwell case, supra. The verity
of the representations was a matter actually or potentially
before the court at the hearing of the October 20, 1949, order.
In submitting the foregoing contention, Appellant does
not for one moment concede that there was any fraud or
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misrepresentation on his part and will demonstrate that
position hereinafter. But for purposes of meeting the Respondent's contention squarely, Appellant submits that the
alleged fraud or misrepresentation was and is intrinsic, not
extrinsic, and was therefore insufficient to have justified
the court's action.
II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A FINDING OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION.

Assuming the proposition that extrinsic fraud or misrepresentation is grounds for vacating a judgment or
order, it seems clear that the order of vacation must be based
upon a finding of fraud or misrepresentation. One can
search the record in vain to find any competent evidence
which is clear and substantial enough to warrant such a
finding. The self-evident question arises: What evidence
must there be to support a finding of fraud or misrepresentation. Can such a finding be made on the basis of surmise, speculation, suspicion, supposition, conjecture and
heresay. Or must the finding be based upon evidence which
strongly establishes a conviction as to fraud and misrepresentation. In a criminal proceeding such as this, good reason would appear for applying the orthodox rule that there
must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has
by way of dicta applied that orthodox rule to these very
circumstances.
In Anderson v. State, supra, the court made the following significant statement regarding the quantum of
proof of fraud required to vacate a judgment.
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"The alleged conspiracy between Cora and her
mother is relied on as extrinsic fraud. The only
evidence of conspiracy is the fact that they testified
to the same effect. That is a circumstance to be considered, especially as the witnesses were separated
by order of the court. But is the circumstance conclusive? Does it produce conviction beyond a reasonable doubt? (Emphasis added.)
Moreover this court has consistently followed the well
established rule that a finding cannot be based upon surmise, speculation, suppostion or conjecture.

Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 75 P.
(2d) 660, 94 Ut. 76;
Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n of Railroad Employees, 89 P. (2d) 490, 97 Ut. 91;
Mehr v. Child, 61 P. (2d) 624, 90 Ut. 348.
It would not seem necessary in this case to determine
whether the degree of proof required to show fraud or misrepresentation for vacating a judgment in a criminal proceeding is proof which establishes conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt or proof of a lesser degree. It is clear that
the evidence herein falls far short of any reasonable requirement. What is the evidence upon which the court made a
finding of fraud and upon which Respondent defends that
finding. Respondent has set out in its brief the evidence
which it apparently deems strongest.
At pages 7, 8 and 9 of its brief, Respondent refers to
testimony of Dr. William Henning at the hearing of October
20, 1949, and the hearing of June 9, 1951. This is offered
by Respondent to show fraud and misrepresentation. The
substance of the evidence at said pages is that Dr. Henning
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believed in October, 1949, that Appellant's health was poor
and that a change of altitude and climate was advisable·
'
and that the change did not produce the anticipated results.
Is that evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. In fact, that
testimony supports the representations made by Appellant
in October, 1949, that it was advisable from a medical
standpoint that Appellant try a different climate. Dr.
Henning's statement as to letters received from Appellant
in Florida supports the testimony that Appellant's health
did not improve. By what distortion of the imagination can
that evidence be said to show fraud or misrepresentation in
procuring the 1949 order.
Reference is made by Respondent at pages 9 and 10
of its brief to testimony of Appellant at the two hearings
to show fraud and misrepresentation. The evidence referred
to contains no misrepresentation by Appellant as to his intentions in October, 1949. All that testimony shows is that
Appellant was a sick man and planned to try a different
climate and intended to reside in Florida if that climate improved his health. No contrary representation was made
to the court. The important question is not what Appellant's health subsequently required him to do but what his
intention was at the time he applied to the court in October,
1949, and whether he misrepresented those intentions.
At pages 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's brief, reference
is made to alleged representations made by Appellant's attorney in October, 1949, as to Appellant's having a position
in a Florida hospital. Is there any evidence that Appellant's
attorney knew the alleged representations were untrue? Is
there any evidence that the representations were untrue?
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Respondent states at page 11 that Appellant's memory
simply failed him on this matter. Can a finding of fraud
and misrepresentation be predicated upon a lapse of memory?
It is said by Respondent at page 12 of its brief that

Appellant acted in bad faith in going to a judge other than
Judge Van Cott, in the Fall of 1950, for advice on the
October, 1949 order. Does that show fraud in October,
1949? Does it show anything except the fact that the
Appellant was keenly anxious to determine his rights and
went to see the presiding judge of the Third Judicial District Court to determine them, a man who had unquestioned
authority to advise Appellant.
It is important to re-emphasize the proposition that
only extrinsic fraud or misrepresentation as to the procurement of the October 20, 1949, order would constitute
grounds for vacating the order. The essential nature of
fraud or misrepresentation as applied here would be representing a matter to be otherwise than it was with knowledge
of the falsity of the representations. The fraud or misrepresentation claimed against Appellant is, it would appear, representations made by him as to his intentions
kno'Yn at the time to be untrue. The evidence referred to
by Respondent in its brief does not prove or tend to prove
that Appellant made representations to the court which he
knew to be untrue. Only by conjecture, speculation and
suspicion can a finding of fraud and misrepresentation be
made.

In contrast to the foregoing, the evidence is uncontradicted that Appellant's health was bad in October, 1949;
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that he was advised by a doctor to try a different climate;
that he so advised the court; that Appellant closed his
practice, stored his equipment, packed his furniture and
physically moved with his family to a milder climate, where
he remained long enough to determine that the climate
did not improve his health.
Appellant again emphasizes to the court the clear proposition that the trial judge could not base a finding of
fraud or misrepresentation upon extra judicial utterances
and statements of unidentified persons. Respondent would
apparently concede that such matters would not support
the required finding.

It is submitted, therefore, that the evidence herein
was insufficient to support a finding of f"raud or misrepresentation in procurement of the October 20, 1949 order.

III.
THE ALLEGED FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION GOES TO IMMATERIAL MATT E R S AN D DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
GROUNDS FOR VACATING THE ORDER OF
OCTOBER 20, 1949.
Respondent has conceded that the alleged condition
of banishment from the State of Utah was void. Any
representations concerning that matter would appear, therefore, to be immaterial. And as pointed out in Appellant's
brief, banishment was not and could not be a mandatory,
material basis for issuance of the October 20, 1949 order.
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Appellant's position is that the said condition or matter
being immaterial, any representations made concerning it
would not constitute grounds for vacating the order. In
order to raise fraud as a grounds for vacating a judgment,
it must be shown that the fraud relates to a material issue
or question entering into the judgment. The principle that
fraud or misrepresentation as to immaterial matters is
not actionable has been applied by this court in Hecht v.
Metzler, 48 Pac. 37, 14 Ut. 408. For a general statement
of this principle see 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Section 111. Another analogous principle is the one of general acceptance followed in this jurisdiction that a witness
cannot be impeached on the basis of immaterial matters.

IV.

U:·

~--

rn ::

VACATION OF THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20,
1949, ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION WOULD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS PROCEEDING CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF' DUE PROCESS
OF LAW UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7
AND 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND
UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The essential elements of due process of law under
the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution
of the United States are notice, and an opportunity to be
heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding.
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12 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 573;
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 54 S.
Ct. 330;
Denver and R. G. W. R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 279 P. 612, 74 Ut. 316.
Due process of law requires that a defendant in a criminal
proceeding be given notice of the grounds for which he
is charged and a reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend on those grounds. This requirement of notice under ·
due process of law has direct application to the facts of
this appeal. As pointed out in appellant's introductory
statement, at no time prior to the oral opinion of the trial
judge at the hearing on the petition to vacate the October
20, 1949, order was appellant given notice that the grounds
charged were fraud and misrepresentation concerning procurement of said order. Appellant's position is that if the
order of vacation was based upon fraud and misrepresentation, the order was invalid as a violation of due process of
law because no notice was afforded to appellant of that
charge and no opportunity was given to defend upon it.
The requirement that notice be given to a defendant
of the grounds asserted for setting aside a suspended sentence, a parole, or a dismissal is well established in this
jurisdiction and elsewhere.
Annotati-on, 54 A. L. R. 1471.
One of the principle cases on this question is the Utah
case, State v. Zolantakis, 70 Ut. 296, 259 Pac. 1044. That
case holds that a convict having been granted a suspension of sentence during good behavior is entitled to notice
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and· hearing on the grounds asserted for setting aside the
suspended sentence before revocation of same.
The court stated as follows at page 1047 of the Pacific
Reporter:

.:.

.... ·

:_:,.,..

"In this state the question here involved is one of
first impression. The statute involved does not point
out a method of procedure. The majority of this
court are of the opinion that a person who has a
sentence suspended during good behavior, without
any limitation, is entitled to a hearing upon the
question of whether or not he has complied with
the conditions imposed; that such hearing must be
according to some well recognized and established
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant is en·,titled to have filed either an affidavit, motion, or
other written pleading setting forth the facts relied
upon for a.revocation of the suspension of sentence;
that the defendant should be given an opportunity to
answer or plead to the charge made; that a hearing
should be had upon the issues joined; and that the
defendant as well as the state be given the right of
cross-examination. If we are correct in our conclusion that the defendant has a vested right to his
personal liberty during good behavior when so ordered without reservation in the original sentence,
any proceeding failing in these essentials is error."
(Emphasis added.)

'-'

This court again said as follows under similar circumstances in State v. Bonza, 150 P. (2d) 970, at 972:
"A defendant out of prison on probation is accorded due process of law by the following steps,
all of which were followed in this case: (1) The
filing of a verified staten1ent or an affidavit in the
case setting forth facts which show a violation of
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the terms of probation. (2) The issuance of an
order to show cause and citation thereon requiring
the defendant to appear and show cause why probation should not be revoked, apprising defendant
of the ground or grounds on which revocation is
sought, and specifying a proper time for hearing.
( 3) A hearing before the court on the question of
violation of some term or condition of probation,
at which the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses against him and also to present
evidence to refute the claimed violation of the conditions of probation. (4) A determination of the
question, followed by entry of an appropriate order.
State v. Zolantakis, supra." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the foregoing decisions that due process

of law under the circumstances of this case required that
notice be given to the Appellant apprising defendant of
the grounds upon which vacation of the October, 1949, order
was based. No such notice was given with respect to the
claim of fraud and misrepresentation.
This case presents even stronger features for application of the stated principle than either of the two Utah
cases mentioned. This is not a situation where defendant
continued after October 20, )949, to be subject to the jurisdiction and custody of the court. The October 20, 1949
order dismissed the action against defendant and finally
discharged him. The petition to vacate said order was in
effect a new proceeding. Although the court has in recent
decisions [McCoy v. Harris, 160 P. (2d) 721, 108 Utah
407, Ex Parte Follett, 225 P. (2d) 16, ... Utah
. ] stated
that the Zolantakis principle should be confined to the facts
of that case, it is believed that this case presents the facts
essential for application of the principle.
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CONCLUSION

ll

n

Appellant submits that the order of October 20, 1949,
was a valid, final and unconditional order. The order can
be deemed conditional only upon a consideration of parole
evidence, which is improper. The alleged condition itself
would, as conceded by Respondent, be void as contrary to
public policy. Either one or all of the reasons stated by
Appellant herein constitute valid and proper grounds for
a holding that the trial court erred in vacating the October
20, 1949 order. In view of the foregoing, Appellant urges
the court to reverse the decision of the trial court and declare the court's order of June 9, 1951, null and void and
order the defendant discharged.

llli

ll

Respectfully submitted,
GRANT MACFARLANE
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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